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DUE PROCESS-ADMmISTRATVE LAW-PUBLIc ASSISTANCE: APPi-
CANT'S RIGHT TO A Fuia HEA NG-Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
Plaintiff applied for admission to a low income housing program
administered by the Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority. The
Authority's regulation concerning admission to the program provided
several standards for determining an applicant's character eligibility.
The regulations required that applicants of unqualified character be
declared ineligible on the general grounds of "non-desirability." Plain-
tiff was denied a place on the waiting list for housing program vacan-
cies on those grounds. Her request for the specific facts supporting
the Housing Authority's decision was denied, and her appeal for a "fair
hearing" to contest the decision was refused. Plaintiff brought suit to
enjoin the Housing Authority from refusing to grant a hearing. Held:
To satisfy the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, applicants for public housing
must be afforded a "fair hearing" to contest a decision to deny bene-
fits. Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 311 F. Supp.
795 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
In Goldberg v. Kelly,' the United States Supreme Court considered,
solely on the basis of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due
process,2 the extent of the right to a "fair hearing" in cases involving
termination of public assistance. New York City's practice of denying
a hearing until welfare benefits had actually been terminated was
challenged. The benefits were disbursed under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program3 which requires partici-
pating states to provide opportunities for hearings.' Since the federal
statute did not specify when the hearing was to be held and the state
statute provided only for a post-termination hearing,5 the Kelly Court
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2. Other cases have dealt with the right to a "fair hearing" in public assistance cases,
but have been decided on grounds other than due process. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing
Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), granting a hearing on the basis of a Department of
Housing and Urban Development circular requiring a hearing prior to ejectment from
a low income housing program.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964). The program is one of joint federal and state govern-
ment contribution, with distribution entrusted to the states.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4) (1964).
5. N.Y. Soc. WFrxmm LAw § 353(2) (McKinney 1966).
576
Applicant's Right to Hearing
had to deal with the question of whether a hearing prior to termina-
tion was constitutionally required. The question arose because of the
traditional classification of the receipt of public assistance as a privi-
lege, not a right. Historically, the "right-privilege" distinction had
been applied in many situations6 to uphold government action chal-
lenged as violating substantive constitutional rights, such as due pro-
cess. The basis of the distinction is that constitutional protection
extends to private rights, those achieved in the private sector, but
not to status achieved through governmental grace.7 Due process did
not apply in welfare cases because status as a recipient of public as-
sistance benefits was a consequence of governmental largess, not of
private right. The Kelly Court rejected the "right-privilege" distinc-
tion because "termination [of benefits] involves state action that ad-
judicates important rights."' Thus, at least in cases involving recipients
of public welfare, it appears that the "right-privilege" argument will
not defeat the constitutional challenge of government action.9
6. For a survey of judicial application of the "right-privilege" distinction, see Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1439 (1968).
7. As noted in Van Astyne, supra note 6, the distinction is clearly expressed in Mc-
Auliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (the first amend-
ment will not protect a policeman discharged for violating a regulation prohibiting
political activities, because being a policeman is a privilege, not a right). See also Starkey
v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963) (married high school students
may be denied the privilege of participating in extracurricular activities); Hornstein v.
Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 412 IMI. 365, 106 N.E.2d 354 (1952) (the privilege of
retaining a retail liquor license may be denied without due process) ; Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (there is no prohibition in the
Constitution against the denial of the privilege of government employment for the em-
ployee's political activities, beliefs or affiliations) ; and Wilkie v. O'Conner, 261 App. Div.
373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1941) (the denial of welfare benefits on the grounds that the
recipient insisted on sleeping under an old barn does not offend the right to live where
one pleases).
8. 397 U.S. at 262.
9. As noted in Van Alstyne, supra note 6, courts have rejected the "right-privilege"
distinction in various other situations on several grounds, including the following:
a) The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions: conditioning the receipt of largess
on relinquishment of private rights guaranteed by the Constitution is as forbidden to
government as direct government violation of those rights. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation cannot be discontinued for the re-
cipient's refusal of Saturday employment for religious reasons) ; Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied., 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (the State
cannot condition the granting of a privilege on the renunciation of the right to procedural
due process); and Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926)
(holding unconstitutional a state act conditioning the use of state highways by private
carriers on their dedicating their property to the business of public transportation, thus
subjecting themselves to all the duties and burdens imposed by the act on common car-
riers).
b) Conditioning the granting of privileges so as to indirectly violate the rights of
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In determining the extent to which due process required a hearing
prior to termination,' ° the Kelly Court applied two tests. First, the
determination is influenced by the extent to which the recipient may
be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."" Second, the Court applied
the "interest balancing" test, as it had previously done in reviewing
the propriety of summary action by government agencies.'" This test
involves a weighing of the individual's interest in obtaining an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to government action against the government's
interest in taking the summary action.
The Court in Kelly had no trouble finding that denial of a hearing
prior to termination of benefits would expose a recipient to possible
grievous loss. Termination of aid during the period prior to the hear-
ing might deprive the recipient "of the very means by which to live
while he waits.' 3 Applying the "interest balancing" test, the Court
found that the recipient's interest in continuing to receive cash pay-
ments on which his existence depended outweighed New York City's
interest in preserving public funds by avoiding payments to ineligible
private citizens. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (holding unconstitutional
an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to report membership in any organization on the
grounds that, even though the statute did not prohibit membership in any organization,
it would discourage controversial political association in violation of the freedom of asso-
ciation guaranteed by the first amendment).
c) Procedural due process as an independent right. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing
Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (granting a hearing on the basis of a Department of
Housing and Urban Development circular requiring a hearing prior to ejectment from a
low income housing program) and Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(the denial of the privilege of a license as a radiotelegraph operation without opportunity
for a hearing violates due process of law).
d) Equal protection under the law. The distribution of privileges must be made
fairly and the bases of classification and treatment must be reasonable. See, e.g., Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (although government employment is a privilege,
regulations restricting the class of persons eligible to continue employment to those willing
to conform to an unreasonable rule of conduct are arbitrary and discriminatory in vio-
lation of equal protection).
10. Several cases have suggested the "flexibility" of due process, depending on the
particular circumstances under review. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (upholding summary action by the Department of
Defense on the basis that the government's interest in national security outweighs the
interest of a short-order cook in working in a restaurant on the premises of a Navy gun
factory); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (upholding sum-
mary action in seizing mislabeled vitamin products); and North American Cold Storage
Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (upholding summary government action in seizing
food not fit for human consumption).
11. 397 U.S. at 263, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951).
12. 397 U.S. at 266. Several cases have supplied justification for applying the "in-
terest balancing" test in similar situations. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) and Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
13. 397 U.S. at 264.
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recipients prior to a "fair hearing." 14 Therefore, a hearing was required
prior to termination of public assistance benefits.
In the principal case, Davis, the court, relying on Kelly, substantially
enlarged the scope of the right to a "fair hearing" in public assistance
cases by extending the right to an applicant for admission to a low
income housing program. Two significant questions are raised by this
analysis. The first, whether the interests of the applicant are protected
by the due process guarantee, appears to be more important in Davis
than the same question asked with respect to the recipient in Kelly.
While the statutory hearing requirement was clearly noted in Kelly,
no reference to such a requirement was made in Davis. If the "right-
privilege" distinction were to be applied to an applicant for public
assistance benefits, 5 the right to a hearing would become quite diffi-
cult to support absent any statutory requirement. As noted above,
however, the Kelly Court rejected the distinction with respect to re-
cipients of public welfare.' 6 The same circumstances exist in the case
of the applicant. A basis for rejecting the "right-privilege" distinction
in all public assistance cases can be found in the Court's treatment of
the problem in Kelly. The Kelly Court held that "[t]he constitutional
challenge [summary action violates due process] cannot be answered
by an argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not
a 'right'." 17 Furthermore, to resolve constitutional conflicts by cate-
gorizing the status of the challenger as "recipient" or "applicant"
seems every bit as artificial as to do so by reference to the privilege-
right dichotomy. Instead of distinguishing between rights and privi-
leges, or applicants and recipients, a fairer result is reached by balanc-
ing the individual's interest against the government's.'8
14. Id. at 265-66.
15. The distinction between applicants and recipients has been made in another area
of the law concerned with the "right-privilege" distinction, parole revocation. An argu-
ment in favor of extending due process protection to parolees is that even though parole
is a privilege and not a right, the privilege, once granted, vests and can only be taken
away with due process. Thus the interests of the applicant for parole would not be pro-
tected because, to him, the privilege of parole has not vested. For a review of the judicial
dilemma over the rights of parolees, see Comment, Right Versus Results: Quo Vadis Due
Process for Parolees, 1 PAcWc L.J. 321 (1970). For a view that the demise of the "right-
privilege" distinction in constitutional analysis may necessitate a showing of probable
cause to re-arrest a parolee for an alleged parole violation, see 46 WAsH. L. REV. 175
(1970).
16. See note 8 and accompanying text, supra.
17. 397 U.S. at 262 (1970), citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
18. Another argument supporting the rejection of the "right-privilege" distinction is
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The second question raised by the Davis decision is whether the
court accurately applied the tests articulated in Kelly in extending due
process benefits to an applicant for public assistance. First, does the
denial of a "fair hearing" expose the applicant to possible "grievous
loss"? 9 Since determination of eligibility did not automatically assure
an applicant of immediate placement, the denial of a place on the
waiting list without a hearing would not deprive the applicant of a
place to live. As the Davis court correctly noted, the question of
present and irreparable harm in the case under review was not as
clear as it was in the case of termination of cash payments prior to a
"fair hearing" concerning eligibility for benefits." In the latter case,
a tangible benefit on which the recipient depended was being taken
away, while in the case under review, a merely potential benefit was
being denied. The court noted, however, that the applicant could not
begin to wait for a vacancy until he was declared eligible and that time
lost could never be regained.2 Apparently, lost time was considered
sufficiently "grievous" to satisfy the first Kelly test.2
Second, were the interests of the applicant in obtaining a "fair hear-
ing" sufficient to outweigh those of the Housing Authority in pursuing
summary action? Both the government's interest and that of the in-
dividual in Davis may be distinguished from the interests in Kelly.
First, the Housing Authority's interest was solely in avoiding the costs
of administrative hearings, while New York City's interest was in
avoiding those costs plus the costs of paying ineligible recipients until
termination of benefits was finalized at a "fair hearing." Second, the
interest of the applicant in obtaining a place on the waiting list was
that the "substantial influence which expanded governmental activity gives the govern-
ment over the private lives of its citizenry makes the restraints of substantive due process
necessary" in all cases. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1462 (1968).
For a similar argument and a more lengthy investigation of the problems and pat-
terns of government largess, see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) ; see
also Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965); Comment, The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare
Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 Mica. L. REV. 112
(1969) ; Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37
FoRD. L. REV. 604 (1969). See note 24, infra, for several cases involving the legal interests
of "applicants."
19. See note 11 and accompanying text, supra.
20. 311 F. Supp. at 797.
21. Id.
22. See text accompanying note 11, supra.
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not as great as the recipient's interest in continuing to receive cash
payments on which his existence depended.25 Relying on the argument
that lost time can never be recovered, the Davis court held that the
interests of the applicant were sufficient to outweigh those of the Hous-
ing Authority and, therefore, that a "fair hearing" was required.24
As discussed above, the extension in Davis of the right to a "fair
hearing" to an applicant for a place on the waiting list for low income
housing constitutes a substantial broadening of the scope of that right.
Davis followed Kelly in using the "grievous loss" and "interest bal-
ancing" tests, however, and the problem remaining is simply to deter-
mine what factual circumstances will satisfy the requirements of those
tests. 2
5
A more serious, unanswered question is whether the tests, as used,
are adequate to determine the right to a hearing in such cases, or
whether courts should consider other factors in making the determina-
tion. The threshold "grievous loss" test seems adequate. It simply
determines whether the individual involved has a sufficient interest to
justify a formal hearing to adjudicate his claims, a fact issue to be
worked out from case to case.
The "interest balancing" test, however, is harder to utilize. It re-
quires both identification of the interests to be balanced and judg-
ment as to the relative importance of the competing interests. Failure
to identify all the relevant interests can destroy the validity of the bal-
ancing process.
The Davis and Kelly courts correctly recognized as relevant the
interests of the welfare recipient or applicant in receiving the benefits,
23. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
24. Although most due process problems have concerned persons actually receiving
government largess, some cases have extended protection to the interests of applicants. See,
e.g., Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (holding that
a certified public accountant was entitled to notice and a hearing to contest a denial of
his application to practice before the Board based on his alleged unfitness) and Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir., 1964) (holding that due process protection must be
afforded the interests of an applicant for a retail liquor license because licensing is ajudicial act involving the determination of factual issues and the application of legal
criteria).
25. The United States Supreme Court has had one opportunity to consider the limits
of the right to a "fair hearing" since its decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The problem in Daniel v. Goliday, 398 U.S. 73 (1970), concerned the right to
a "fair hearing" prior to reduction of benefits. The judgment of the District Court in
Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969), holding that a hearing was re-
quired, was vacated for failure to pay specific attention to the issue of reduction. Thus,
no new light was shed upon the problems discussed here.
581
Washington Law Review
and those of the government in protecting government funds. However,
both Davis and Kelly seem to have ignored the practical public interest
in maximizing the funds actually disbursed in welfare grants to individ-
ual recipients. More funds would be available if the number of
administrative hearings were reduced.
The need to limit the right to a "fair hearing" could become espe-
cially important during times of financial troubles for state and local
governments. The limit should be reached when the governmental
(public) interest in extending welfare benefits as far as possible, and
in paying grants sufficient to meet the neds of those eligible to receive,
outweighs the interests of the individual in obtaining a "fair hearing."
Neither the Davis court, nor the United States Supreme Court in
Kelly, expressly considered that public interest. The question, then, is
whether practical limitations on public assistance funds are proper
considerations for courts in determining Constitutional due process
problems.
PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FUNDS:
ANOTHER INTEREST TO BE WEIGHED AND BALANCED
The conclusion that practical limitations on public assistance funds
are proper considerations for courts is supported by the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Dandridge v. Williams.2 6 In Dan-
dridge, the Court upheld Maryland's maximum public assistance grant
limitation which was challenged as an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection. 7 The court decided:2
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect.
26. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
27. Not considered here is the challenge on the ground that Maryland's maximum
grant limitation violated the provisions of Aid to Families with Dependent Children Pro-
gram, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964). The Court held that there was no violation. Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483 (1970).
Generally, states participating in the AFDC program calculate standards of need on
which the amount of grant payments is based. See, e.g., 8 WAsHl. ADrm. CODE §§ 388-25-
085 to 130 (1969). Public assistance grants are disbursed in the amount that the in-
dividual's monthly "needs" exceed his monthly non-exempt resources (income), except
as modified by the maximum grant. 8 WAsHr. ADm. CODE § 388-33-025 (1969). Thus if
the individual's needs exceed his non-exempt resources by $500, and the maximum grant
limitation is $350, only $350 is paid.
28. 397 U.S. at 485.
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Inequality in classifying does not offend the Constitution if the classifi-
cation has some "reasonable basis," 29 because the "problems of govern-
ment are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodation."30 The Dandridge Court found a reasonable basis for
Maryland's maximum grant limitation inl
the State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in
avoiding discrimination between welfare families and families of
the working poor.
Employment was encouraged by the provision in the maximum grant
limit allowing retention of money earned without reduction in the
amount of the grant. Maryland suggested two additional interests to
support the reasonableness of the maximum grant; providing incen-
tives for family planning and allocating limited public funds in such
a way as to meet the needs of the largest possible number of families.
The Court decided that it did not have to explore all the reasons
advanced to justify the maximum grant because sufficient state in-
terests had been foundY2
The Court's recognition of legitimate practical state interests sup-
porting classification in public welfare plans suggests that similar in-
terests may be considered in determining the extent of the right to
a "fair hearing," even when agency action is challenged on a purely
constitutional basis. The most pressing problem facing state depart-
ments of public assistance is that of allocating scarce funds among
overwhelming needs. The problem is magnified during economic de-.
pressions, when the number of persons eligible to receive public
assistance benefits rapidly increases and the amount of available tax
revenue decreases. Costs of administrative hearings for applicants
and recipients, and costs of continuing payments to ineligible recipients
prior to final termination at a "fair hearing," increase the load on
already overburdened state public assistance budgets3 As the number
29. Id.
30. Id. at 485, citing Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70
(1913).
31. 397 U.S. at 486.
32. Id.
33. The burdensome effect of the costs of fair hearings is illustrated by the following
data. The approximate average cost of a fair hearing in Washington is:
Fair Hearing Unit's Cost $86.00
Local Unit's Cost 48.00
Assistant Attorney General's Cost 45.00
Total Cost $179.00
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of applicants and recipients increases, the need for quick government
action becomes paramount 4 Faced with the "fair hearing" requirement,
state public assistance departments are forced to allocate funds for that
purpose. This allocation results in a decrease in funds available to meet
the needs of those eligible to receive benefits. The obvious state re-
sponse to the problem of limited resources is to cut assistance programs
and to impose maximum grant limitations. Those eligible to receive
benefits will suffer to the extent that their requirements will not be
satisfied. They will, as noted in Goldberg v. Kelly,5 be exposed to
possible "grievous loss"; that is, the loss of grant funds and public
assistance services on which their lives depend.
Logically, the public interest in maximizing the effect of limited
public assistance resources is a legitimate state interest to be weighed
in the "interest balancing" equation. Although this interest might be
included as part of the governmental interest in protecting funds, there
is no indication in either Davis or Kelly that the courts did so. If they
had, it appears that greater weight would have been given to the
interest in protecting funds, since the focus would then have shifted
from an abstract view of government qua government with an interest
in simply conserving funds, to a practical view of government as repre-
sentative of the public, with an interest in the best possible use of the
funds.
Furthermore, even such an inclusion of the public interest in maximi-
zation of effect within the governmental interest in protection is prob-
ably inadequate. The two viewpoints are logically distinguishable. The
first requires the court to look at the interest from the standpoint of
those who will receive benefits, and focuses upon the practical issue
In November of 1970 the average grant paid to cases and persons in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children-Regular Program was:
Per Case $201.69
Per Person 59.38
The average cost of one fair hearing, if the funds were available for distribution to re-
cipients, would be sufficient to meet 90% of the average monthly grant payment to one
recipient. On a per-person basis, the amount would be sufficient to meet the payments to
three individual recipients for a whole month. Letter from State of Washington Depart-
ment of Social and Health Services To Barry E. Wolf, Jan. 5, 1971, on file in offices of
Washington Law Review.
34. The current rate of applications for public assistance is approximately 300 per
week at the King County Central Office, State of Washington Department of Public Assis-
tance. Interview with Mrs. Mary Helms, King County Central Office, State of Washing-
ton Department of Public Assistance, December 18, 1970.
35. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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of available funds, while the second requires spending as little as pos-
sible for any purpose. The best analytical approach would be to
separate the two interests, focus on each independently, and weigh the
combined result against the interest of the individual recipient or
applicant. Such an approach might have changed the result in Davis.
While no one factor should control the "interest balancing" test, all
relevant factors should be included. The result will be a truer applica-
tion of the test and a stronger rule as to the right to a "fair hearing"
in public assistance cases.
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